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ABSTRACT
Game (Israeli) options in a multi-asset market model with proportional transaction
costs are studied in the case when the buyer is allowed to exercise the option and
the seller has the right to cancel the option gradually at a mixed (or randomised)
stopping time, rather than instantly at an ordinary stopping time. Allowing gradual
exercise and cancellation leads to increased flexibility in hedging, and hence tighter
bounds on the option price as compared to the case of instantaneous exercise and
cancellation. Algorithmic constructions for the bid and ask prices, and the associated
superhedging strategies and optimal mixed stopping times for both exercise and
cancellation are developed and illustrated. Probabilistic dual representations for bid
and ask prices are also established.
Keywords: game options, randomised stopping, transaction costs, optimal stopping.
1. Introduction
A game (i.e. Israeli) option is a contract between an option buyer and seller, which
allows the buyer the right to exercise the option, and the seller the right to cancel
the option at any time up to expiry. The payoff associated with such a game option
is due at the earliest of the exercise and cancellation times. If the option is cancelled
before it is exercised, then the buyer also receives additional compensation from the
seller. Game options were first introduced by Kifer [16] and have been studied in a
frictionless setting in a number of papers; for a survey of this work see Kifer [17]. Game
options have proved to be important not only in their own right, but also because they
underpin the theory for other traded derivatives such as convertible bonds or callable
options; see e.g. Kallsen and Ku¨hn [15], Ku¨hn and Kyprianou [22], Bielecki et al. [3],
Wang and Jin [40], or Kwok [24].
Transaction costs were first considered in the context of game options by Kifer
[18], who extended the results established for American options by Roux and Zastaw-
niak [31] in the case of a market with a single risky security. Kifer’s work [18] has
recently been generalised by Roux [29] for game options in discrete multi-asset models
with proportional transaction costs. Due to a negative result by Dolinsky [9] that the
superreplication price of a game option in continuous time under proportional trans-
action costs is the initial value of a trivial buy-and-hold strategy, both Kifer [18] and
Roux [29] study game options in discrete time. This approach is also adopted in the
present paper.
Consistently with the wider literature on game options, the papers by Kifer [18]
and Roux [29] take it for granted that the option can only be exercised or cancelled
instantaneously and in full, in other words, at an ordinary stopping time. This means
that pricing and hedging involves non-convex optimization problems for both the buyer
and seller. In this case, Kifer [18] and Roux [29] showed that the bid and ask prices
can be computed algorithmically, as can optimal strategies for both the buyer and the
seller. Moreover, they established probabilistic dual representations for the bid and
ask prices. In common with American options in this setting, the dual representations
involve so-called mixed (or randomised) stopping times (used before in various contexts
by Baxter and Chacon [1], Chalasani and Jha [6], Bouchard and Temam [4] and many
others).
In the present paper we allow increased flexibility for both the buyer and seller by
permitting both exercise and cancellation to take place gradually, i.e. at a mixed stop-
ping time, rather than instantaneously at an ordinary stopping time. Such flexibility
is available to investors who hold a portfolio of options and may wish to manage their
exposure by exercising or cancelling some of these options at different times.
In the presence of proportional transaction costs, gradual exercise and cancellation
is closely linked to the notion of deferred solvency; this has already been studied in the
context of American options with gradual exercise by Roux and Zastawniak [32]. In the
presence of a large bid-ask spread on the underlying assets, for example in the event of
temporary illiquidity in the market, an agent may become insolvent in the traditional
sense at some time instant t, but still able to return to solvency at a later time
by trading in a self-financing way. Allowing such deferred solvency positions, rather
than insisting on immediate solvency at all times, also leads to increased flexibility in
constructing hedging strategies for both the seller and buyer of a game option.
In this setting, i.e. for game options with gradual exercise and cancellation under
transaction costs and deferred solvency, we establish algorithmic constructions of the
bid and ask prices and of optimal hedging strategies for both the seller and buyer
of the option. In doing so, we extend the results of Kifer [18] and Roux [29], which
apply to game options that allow only instantaneous exercise and cancellation with
immediate solvency.
It turns out that, in the presence of proportional transaction costs, allowing deferred
solvency along with gradual exercise and cancellation for game options leads to tighter
bid-ask spreads as compared to the case of instantaneous exercise and cancellation.
The reason for this is that the sets of buyer and seller superhedging strategies under
instantaneous exercise and cancellation can be embedded in the corresponding sets
for gradual exercise and cancellation. Taking the minimum (in the case of the seller)
and the maximum (for the buyer) then leads to a lower (sometimes strictly lower)
ask price and higher (sometimes strictly higher) bid price under gradual exercise and
cancellation, hence a tighter (sometimes strictly tighter) bid-ask spread.
It is also important to note that allowing gradual exercise and cancellation turns
pricing and hedging for the buyer and seller of a game option into convex optimization
problems, massively enhancing the efficiency of the pricing and hedging algorithms as
compared with the non-convex case studied by Kifer [18] and Roux [29]. Furthermore,
convexity facilitates the use of duality methods, and could potentially allow extending
the linear vector optimisation techniques which were developed by Lo¨hne and Rudloff
[25] for European options.
The methods and results presented in this paper build on a large body of work for
European and American options under transaction costs, including papers by Merton
[26], Dermody and Rockafellar [8], Boyle and Vorst [5], Bensaid, Lesne, Page`s and
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Scheinkman [2], Edirisinghe, Naik and Uppal [10], Jouini and Kallal [12], Kusuoka [23],
Koehl, Pham and Touzi [20, 21], Stettner [36, 37], Perrakis and Lefoll [28], Rutkowski
[34], Touzi [39], Kabanov [13], Jouini [11], Palmer [27], Chalasani and Jha [6], Kabanov
and Stricker [14], Kocin´ski [19], Schachermayer [35], Bouchard and Temam [4], Tokarz
and Zastawniak [38], Chen, Palmer and Sheu [7], Roux, Tokarz and Zastawniak [30],
Roux and Zastawniak [31, 32, 33], Lo¨hne and Rudloff [25].
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the multi-asset model with pro-
portional transaction costs and summarizes the results from Roux and Zastawniak [32]
that will be used in this paper. Game options with gradual exercise and cancellation
are introduced in Section 3. Pricing algorithms for the seller and buyer, together with
dual representations, are presented in Sections 4 and 5. The relative tightness of bid-
ask spreads under gradual and instantaneous exercise and cancellation is explored in
Section 6. Proofs of results in Sections 4–6 are deferred to Section 8. An example is
provided in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Many-asset model with proportional transaction costs
We consider the discrete-time market model with many assets (conveniently thought
of as currencies) and proportional transaction costs introduced by Kabanov [13] and
studied by Kabanov and Stricker [14], Schachermayer [35] and others.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space with filtration (Ft)
T
t=0. We assume that Ω is
finite, F0 = {∅,Ω}, FT = F = 2
Ω and P(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. For each t = 0, . . . , T ,
by Ωt we denote the collection of atoms of Ft, called the nodes of the associated tree
model.
The market model contains d assets or currencies. At each trading date t =
0, 1, . . . , T and for each k, j = 1, . . . , d, one unit of asset k can be obtained by exchang-
ing pijkt > 0 units of asset j. We assume that the exchange rates pi
jk
t are Ft-measurable
and pijjt = 1 for all t and j, k.
For each t = 0, . . . , T let Lt := L
0(Rd;Ft) be the collection of Ft-measurable R
d-
valued random variables. We can identify elements of Lt with R
d-valued functions
on Ωt. Any x ∈ Lt can be thought of as a portfolio with positions x
1, . . . , xd in the
d assets. We say that a portfolio x ∈ Lt can be exchanged into a portfolio y ∈ Lt at
time t whenever there are Ft-measurable random variables β
jk ≥ 0, j, k = 1, . . . , d
such that for all k = 1, . . . , d
yk = xk +
d∑
j=1
βjk −
d∑
j=1
βkjpikjt ,
where βjk represents the number of units of asset k received as a result of exchanging
some units of asset j.
The solvency cone Kt ⊆ Lt is the set of portfolios that are solvent at time t, i.e.
those portfolios at time t that can be exchanged into portfolios with non-negative
positions in all d assets. It follows that Kt is the polyhedral convex cone generated by
the canonical basis e1, . . . , ed of Rd and the vectors pijkt e
j − ek for j, k = 1, . . . , d. We
also refer to Kt as the immediate solvency cone to distinguish it from the so-called
deferred solvency cone Qt to be introduced later.
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A trading strategy y = (yt)
T+1
t=0 is a predictable R
d-valued process with final value
assumed to be yT+1 = 0 for notational convenience. For each t > 0 the portfolio
yt ∈ Lt−1 is held from time t−1 to time t, and y0 is the initial endowment. We denote
by Φ the set of such trading strategies.
A trading strategy y ∈ Φ is said to be self-financing whenever
yt − yt+1 ∈ Kt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. (1)
Note that no implicitly assumed self-financing condition is included in the definition
of Φ.
A trading strategy y ∈ Φ is called an arbitrage opportunity if it is self-financing,
y0 = 0 and there is a portfolio x ∈ LT \ {0} with x
j ≥ 0 for each j = 1, . . . , d and such
that yT − x ∈ KT . This notion of arbitrage was considered by Schachermayer [35].
The absence of arbitrage in this sense is formally different but equivalent to the weak
no-arbitrage condition introduced by Kabanov and Stricker [14].
Theorem 2.1. [14, 35] The model admits no arbitrage opportunity if and only if
there exists a probability measure Q equivalent to P and an Rd-valued Q-martingale
S = (St)
T
t=0 such that
St ∈ K
∗
t \ {0} for all t = 0, . . . , T, (2)
where K∗t := {y ∈ Lt | y · x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Kt} is the polar of −Kt.
We denote by P the set of pairs (Q, S) satisfying the conditions in Theorem 2.1,
and by P¯ the set of pairs (Q, S) satisfying the conditions in Theorem 2.1 but with Q
absolutely continuous with respect to (and not necessarily equivalent to) P. We assume
for the remainder of this paper that the model admits no arbitrage opportunities,
i.e. P 6= ∅.
Any portfolio x ∈ Kt is immediately solvent at time t, in the sense that it can be
converted at time t into one with non-negative positions in all d assets. For American
and game options under transaction costs, the following weaker type of solvency also
proves useful. We denote by Qt the collection of portfolios x ∈ Lt such that there is a
sequence ys ∈ Ls−1 for s = t+ 1, . . . , T + 1 satisfying the conditions
x− yt+1 ∈ Kt, ys − ys+1 ∈ Ks for all s = t+ 1, . . . , T, yT+1 = 0.
We call such a sequence yt+1, . . . , yT+1 a liquidation strategy starting from x at time t.
The portfolios in Qt are those that can eventually (though possibly not immediately
at time t) be converted by means of a sequence of self-financing transactions into
a portfolio with zero positions in all assets. An equivalent way of constructing the
deferred solvency cones is to put
QT := KT
and then
Qt := Qt+1 ∩ Lt +Kt for t = T − 1, . . . , 0
by backward induction. It turns out that Qt is a convex polyhedral cone. We call it
the deferred solvency cone. See [32] for more information on deferred solvency.
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2.2. Mixed stopping times
A mixed (or randomised) stopping time is a non-negative adapted process φ = (φt)
T
t=0
such that
T∑
t=0
φt = 1.
The collection of mixed stopping times will be denoted by X .
For any φ ∈ X we put
φ∗t :=
T∑
s=t
φs for t = 0, . . . , T, φ
∗
T+1 := 0. (3)
Observe that φ∗ is a predictable process since φ∗0 = 1 is F0-measurable and φ
∗
t =
1−
∑t−1
s=0 φs is Ft−1-measurable for each t = 1, . . . , T .
For example, in the case of a game option subject to gradual cancellation, φt could
represent a fraction of the option that is cancelled at time t, whereas φ∗t would be the
part of the option that has not been cancelled before t.
For any adapted process X and for any φ ∈ X we define the process X evaluated
at φ as
Xφ :=
T∑
t=0
φtXt.
We also put
Xφ∗t :=
T∑
s=t
φsXs for t = 0, . . . , T, X
φ∗
T+1 := 0.
The collection T of ordinary stopping times can be embedded in X by identifying
every τ ∈ T with the mixed stopping time χτ ∈ X defined as
χτt := 1{t=τ}
for each t = 0, . . . , T . (Here 1A denotes the indicator function of an event A ∈ F .)
2.3. American options with gradual exercise and cancellation
Here we collect the main notions and results concerning American options with gradual
exercise and cancellation under proportional transaction costs; for full details, see [32].
These will be extended to game options, and will also be used as tools to establish
some key results for this extension.
Consider an American option with adapted payoff process Z = (Zt)
T
t=0, where
Zt ∈ Lt represents a portfolio of d assets for each t = 0, . . . , T . If the buyer of the
option is allowed to exercise it gradually according to a mixed stopping time ψ ∈ X ,
then the sequence of portfolios ψtZt is to be delivered by the option seller to the buyer
at times t = 0, . . . , T .
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The seller needs to hedge against all mixed stopping times ψ ∈ X that can be
chosen by the buyer. Because the seller can react to the buyer’s choice of ψ, the
hedging strategy may depend on ψ. We are going to write zψt for the time t position
in the strategy.
On each trading date t, the seller needs to deliver the payoff ψtZt and to rebalance
the strategy from zψt to z
ψ
t+1 without injecting any additional wealth, and can only use
knowledge of ψ and the market up to and including time t. This leads to the following
conditions.
Definition 2.2. Let Z = (Zt)
T
t=0 be an adapted process. For an American option with
payoff process Z and gradual exercise, a seller’s superhedging strategy is a mapping
z : X → Φ that satisfies the rebalancing condition
∀ψ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T : zψt − ψtZt − z
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt (4)
and the non-anticipation condition
∀ψ, ψ′ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T :
⋂t−1
s=0{ψs = ψ
′
s} ⊆ {z
ψ
t = z
ψ′
t }. (5)
The family of such strategies will be denoted by Ψa(Z).
Definition 2.3. The seller’s (or ask) price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of an American
option with payoff process Z and gradual exercise is defined as
paj (Z) := inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(Z) : xej = z0
}
.
The following representation of the seller’s price was obtained in [32]. In this rep-
resentation, for any ψ ∈ X , we denote by P¯dj (ψ) the collection of pairs (Q, S) such
that Q is a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to P and S is an
Rd-valued adapted process such that
Sjt = 1, St ∈ Q
∗
t \ {0} and EQ(S
ψ∗
t+1|Ft) ∈ Q
∗
t for all t = 0, . . . , T,
where Q∗t := {y ∈ Lt | y · x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Qt} is the polar of −Qt.
Theorem 2.4. [32, Theorem 4.2] The seller’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of an
American option with payoff process Z and gradual exercise can be expressed as
paj (Z) = max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (ψ)
EQ((Z · S)ψ).
3. Game options with gradual exercise and cancellation
A game option as introduced in [16] and studied in [29] is a contract between an option
buyer and seller, which gives the buyer the right to exercise the option at any stopping
time τ ∈ T , and also gives the seller the right to cancel the option at any stopping
time σ ∈ T . There are two adapted processes Y = (Yt)
T
t=0 and X = (Xt)
T
t=0 which
determine, respectively, the payoffs due when exercising and cancelling the option.
In the presence of transaction costs Y and X are Rd-valued (i.e. portfolio-valued)
processes; see [18] in the case when d = 2 and [29] for any d ≥ 2. The seller has to
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deliver the portfolio Yτ to the buyer at time τ when σ ≥ τ or the portfolio Xσ at time σ
when σ < τ . That is, the option will be terminated at time σ ∧ τ due to exercise or
cancellation, and the portfolio
Qσ,τ := 1{σ≥τ}Yτ + 1{σ<τ}Xσ (6)
will be changing hands at that time. Observe that exercising the option takes priority
over cancellation when σ = τ . Additionally, it is assumed that
Xt − Yt ∈ Kt for each t = 0, . . . , T. (7)
The difference Xt − Yt can be regarded as a penalty payable by the seller on top of
the payoff Yt when cancelling the option. We shall refer to an option of this kind as a
game (or Israeli) option with instant exercise and cancellation, to distinguish it from
one with gradual exercise and cancellation as described below.
In the present work we allow both the buyer and seller the freedom to exercise or,
respectively, to cancel the option gradually according to mixed stopping times. If the
buyer chooses a mixed stopping time ψ ∈ X as the exercise time and the seller selects
a mixed stopping time φ ∈ X to be the cancellation time, then on each trading date
t = 0, . . . , T the buyer will first be exercising a fraction ψt/ψ
∗
t of the current position
in the option, and then the seller will be cancelling a fraction φt/φ
∗
t of the remaining
position in the option, where ψ∗t and φ
∗
t are given by (3). Once again, exercising takes
priority over cancellation.
In these circumstances, starting with an initial position of ψ∗0φ
∗
0 = 1 option at time 0,
we are going to show by induction that ψ∗t φ
∗
t of the option will neither be exercised
nor cancelled before time t, for each t = 0, . . . , T . It means that ψt/ψ
∗
t of the current
position ψ∗t φ
∗
t , that is, (ψt/ψ
∗
t )ψ
∗
t φ
∗
t = ψtφ
∗
t of the option will be exercised at t, given
that the buyer has priority to exercise. The remaining position in the option will then
be ψ∗t φ
∗
t −ψtφ
∗
t = (ψ
∗
t − ψt)φ
∗
t = ψ
∗
t+1φ
∗
t , hence (φt/φ
∗
t )ψ
∗
t+1φ
∗
t = ψ
∗
t+1φt of the option
will be cancelled by the seller at t. Altogether, ψtφ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t+1φt of the option will be
terminated at t due to exercise or cancellation, leaving
ψ∗t φ
∗
t − ψtφ
∗
t − ψ
∗
t+1φt =
(
ψt + ψ
∗
t+1
) (
φt + φ
∗
t+1
)
− ψt
(
φt + φ
∗
t+1
)
− ψ∗t+1φt
= ψ∗t+1φ
∗
t+1
of the option neither exercised nor cancelled before or at t, to be carried forward to
time t+ 1. This completes the induction.
Remark 1. The minimum ψ ∧φ of mixed stopping times ψ, φ ∈ X can be defined as
(ψ ∧ φ)t := ψtφ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t+1φt
for each t = 0, . . . , T ; see [18]. The above argument shows that a game option with
gradual exercise and cancellation will be terminated according to the mixed stopping
time ψ ∧ φ.
On each trading date t = 0, . . . , T , since ψtφ
∗
t of the option is to be exercised and
ψ∗t+1φt of the option is to be cancelled, the seller will be delivering to the buyer the
7
portfolio
Gφ,ψt := ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt, (8)
where Y = (Yt)
T
t=0 and X = (Xt)
T
t=0 are the exercise and cancellation processes
characterising the game option, that is, Rd-valued adapted processes that satisfy (7).
Clearly, Gφ,ψ = (Gφ,ψt )
T
t=0 is an R
d-valued adapted process, which we shall be referring
to as the payoff process for the game option.
Definition 3.1. A game (or Israeli) option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancel-
lation is a derivative security that can be exercised according to a mixed stopping time
ψ ∈ X chosen by the buyer or cancelled according to a mixed stopping time φ ∈ X
chosen by the seller, giving the buyer the right to receive and obliging the seller to
deliver the portfolio Gφ,ψt = ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt on each trading date t = 0, . . . , T .
Remark 2. In contrast to the above payoff process Gφ,ψt , Kifer [18] refers to the
random variable
Qφ,ψ :=
T∑
s=0
T∑
t=0
φsψtQs,t
as the ‘payoff’ of a game option with exercise and cancellation according to mixed
stopping times φ, ψ ∈ X , without specifying the time instant when this portfolio
should be changing hands. However, the payoff of such an option should not be a single
random variable but in fact an adapted process representing the flow of portfolios to
be delivered on each trading date t = 0, . . . , T . We observe that
Qφ,ψ =
T∑
t=0
Gφ,ψt ,
i.e. Qφ,ψ happens to be the total of all the G
φ,ψ
t for t = 0, . . . , T .
In the present paper Qφ,ψ will prove useful in a different role. Namely, identifying
the mixed stopping time χt ∈ X with a deterministic time t, we are going to use Qφ,χt
for t = 0, . . . , T as the payoff process of an American option with gradual exercise
and invoke the results of [32] to establish a probabilistic representation of the seller’s
price for a game option under gradual exercise and cancellation; see Lemma 4.8 and
Theorem 4.9. Similarly, in the buyer’s case, we are going to use an American option
with gradual exercise and payoff process −Qχt,ψ for t = 0, . . . , T ; see Lemma 5.8 and
Theorem 5.9.
4. Seller’s price and superhedging strategies
The seller of a game option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation needs to
hedge against any mixed stopping time ψ ∈ X chosen by the buyer to exercise the
option. The seller can do this by following a trading strategy uψ = (uψt )
T
t=0 ∈ Φ, which
may depend on ψ. Since uψt denotes a portfolio held over time step t, that is, between
times t − 1 and t, it follows that uψt may depend on the values ψ0, . . . , ψt−1 known
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to the seller at time t − 1, when this portfolio is to be created, but not on the yet
unknown (to the seller) values ψt, . . . , ψT . This is the reason for the non-anticipation
condition (10) in Definition 4.1.
In addition to choosing the trading strategy uψ ∈ Φ, the seller can select a mixed
stopping time φ ∈ X to cancel the option, and must be able to deliver the portfolioGφ,ψt
on each date t = 0, . . . , T without injecting any additional wealth into the strategy.
This justifies the rebalancing condition (9).
Definition 4.1. For a game option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation,
a seller’s superhedging strategy is a pair (φ, u), where φ ∈ X and u : X → Φ, that
satisfies the rebalancing condition
∀ψ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T : uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt (9)
and the non-anticipation condition
∀ψ, ψ′ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T :
⋂t−1
s=0{ψs = ψ
′
s} ⊆ {u
ψ
t = u
ψ′
t }. (10)
The family of such strategies will be denoted by Φa(Y,X).
The least expensive (in a particular currency j) seller’s superhedging strategy gives
rise to the seller’s price of the option.
Definition 4.2. The seller’s (or ask) price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option
(Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation is defined as
piaj (Y,X) := inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
When comparing Definition 4.1 above with Definition 3.2 of [29], one can see that
the set of seller’s superhedging strategies under instantaneous exercise and cancellation
can be embedded in the set Φa(Y,X). Therefore the ask price under gradual exercise
and cancellation must be lower under gradual exercise and cancellation, as will be
shown in detail in Section 6. The example in Section 7 will demonstrate that it can
be strictly lower.
4.1. Seller’s pricing algorithm
The following is an iterative construction of the set of initial endowments that allow
superhedging the seller’s position in a game option with gradual exercise and cancel-
lation.
Construction 4.3. Construct adapted sequences Yat ,X
a
t ,V
a
t ,W
a
t ,Z
a
t for t =
0, . . . , T as follows. First, put
Yat := Yt +Qt, X
a
t := Xt +Qt
for all t = 0, . . . , T and
WaT := V
a
T := LT , Z
a
T := Y
a
T .
9
Then, for t = T − 1, . . . , 0 define by backward induction
Wat := Z
a
t+1 ∩ Lt,
Vat :=W
a
t +Qt,
Zat := conv{V
a
t ,X
a
t } ∩ Y
a
t ,
where conv{Vat ,X
a
t } is the convex hull of V
a
t and X
a
t .
By a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 5.1 in [32], it follows that Zat are
polyhedral convex sets for all t. We shall see that Za0 is the set of initial endowments
that allow the seller to superhedge their position in the game option (Y,X) with
gradual exercise and cancellation. Once Za0 has been constructed, the following result
can be used to obtain the seller’s price of the option.
Theorem 4.4. The seller’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be expressed as
piaj (Y,X) = min
{
x ∈ R |xej ∈ Za0
}
.
To prove this theorem, we introduce an auxiliary family Λa(Y,X), the elements of
which can be thought of as the strategies superhedging the seller’s position in a game
option with gradual cancellation, instant (rather than gradual) exercise and deferred
(rather than immediate) solvency. The theorem and the following propositions are
proved in the Appendix, Section 8.
Definition 4.5. We define Λa(Y,X) as the family consisting of all pairs (φ, z), where
φ ∈ X and z ∈ Φ, that satisfy the conditions
zt − φtXt − zt+1 ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T.
According to the next proposition, Za0 coincides with the set of initial endowments
for the strategies in Λa(Y,X).
Proposition 4.6.
Za0 =
{
z0 ∈ R
d | (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X)
}
.
We also claim that the set of initial endowments for the strategies in Λa(Y,X)
coincides with that for the strategies in Φa(Y,X).
Proposition 4.7.
{
z0 ∈ R
d | (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X)
}
=
{
u0 ∈ R
d | (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X)
}
.
It follows from Propositions 4.6 and 4.7 that Za0 is the family of initial endowments
for all strategies superhedging the seller’s position in a game option with gradual
exercise and cancellation. This is what’s needed to prove Theorem 4.4, which links the
seller’s price piaj (Y,X) with Z
a
0 . Full details can be found in the Appendix, Section 8.
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4.2. Seller’s price representation
In this section we obtain a dual representation of the seller’s price for game options
with gradual exercise and cancellation. This relies on a similar result established in
[32] for American options with gradual exercise; see Theorem 2.4.
Observe that, by Definition 4.2,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= inf
φ∈χ
inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃u : (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X), xej = u0
}
.
Hence, as a consequence of Lemma 4.8 below, together with Definition 2.3, we have
piaj (Y,X) = inf
φ∈χ
inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) : xe
j = z0
}
= inf
φ∈χ
paj (Qφ, · ),
where Qφ, · = (Qφ,t)
T
t=0 with
Qφ,t := Qφ,χt for t = 0, . . . , T
is the payoff process for an American option with gradual exercise, and where paj (Qφ, · )
is the seller’s price of such an American option.
Lemma 4.8. For any φ ∈ X
{u0 | (φ, u) ∈ Φ
a(Y,X)} = {z0 | z ∈ Ψ
a(Qφ, · )} ,
where Qφ, · = (Qφ,t)
T
t=0 is the payoff process of an American option.
The lemma is proved in the Appendix, Section 8. It turns out that the infimum over
φ ∈ χ in
piaj (Y,X) = inf
φ∈χ
paj (Qφ, · )
is, in fact, a minimum. Moreover, paj (Qφ, · ) can be represented as in Theorem 2.4. This
leads to the following representation.
Theorem 4.9. The seller’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be represented as
piaj (Y,X) = min
φ∈X
max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (ψ)
EQ((Qφ, · · S)ψ).
The details of the proof can be found, once again, in the Appendix, Section 8.
5. Buyer’s price and superhedging strategies
The buyer of a game option (Y,X) will be able to select a mixed stopping time ψ ∈ X
to exercise the option, and can follow a trading strategy uφ = (uφt )
T
t=0 ∈ Φ, which may
11
depend on the cancellation time φ ∈ X chosen by the seller. On each date t = 0, . . . , T
the buyer will be taking delivery of the portfolio Gφ,ψt and can rebalance the current
position uφt in the strategy into u
φ
t+1 in a self-financing way, i.e. without injecting any
additional wealth. The portfolio uφt created by the buyer at time t− 1 may depend on
the seller’s cancellation strategy φ0, . . . , φt−1 up to and including time t − 1, but not
on the values φt, . . . , φT , as these will not yet be known to the buyer at time t − 1.
These considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 5.1. For a game option (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation, a
buyer’s superhedging strategy is a pair (ψ, u), where ψ ∈ X and u : X → Φ, that
satisfies the rebalancing condition
∀φ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T : uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1 ∈ Kt (11)
and the non-anticipation condition
∀φ, φ′ ∈ X ∀t = 0, . . . , T :
⋂t−1
s=0{φs = φ
′
s} ⊆ {u
φ
t = u
φ′
t }. (12)
The family of such strategies will be denoted by Φb(Y,X).
The buyer’s price of the game option in currency j can be understood as the largest
amount in that currency which can be raised against a long position in the option
used as surety. The precise definition is as follows.
Definition 5.2. The buyer’s (or bid) price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option
(Y,X) under gradual exercise and cancellation is defined as
pibj (Y,X) := sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
Comparing Definition 5.1 above with Definition 3.4 of [29], one can observe that the
set of buyer’s superhedging strategies under instantaneous exercise and cancellation
can be embedded in the set Φb(Y,X), and thus the bid price is higher (sometimes
strictly higher; see the example in Section 7) under gradual exercise and cancellation.
This will be shown in Section 6, and the example in Section 7 will demonstrate that
it can sometimes be strictly higher.
5.1. Buyer’s pricing algorithm
As is well known, there is a symmetry between the buyer’s and seller’s superhedging
and pricing problems for a European option. The symmetry consists, essentially, in
reversing the sign of the payoff while also reversing the roles of buyer and seller.
Hence, solving the seller’s problem also yields a solution to the buyer’s problem, and
vice versa. However, for an American option this symmetry is broken, and one needs
to solve the buyer’s and seller’s problems separately; see for example [32] or [33].
On first sight, it might appear that the symmetry between the buyer and seller
might be restored in the case of a game option. However, in fact, this is not so when
the buyer has priority to exercise the option before the seller can cancel it. Reversing
their roles would give priority to the seller. Combined with condition (7), this breaks
the symmetry, and so a specific solution to the buyer’s problem is needed. This is
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facilitated by the following construction.
Construction 5.3. Construct adapted sequences Ybt ,X
b
t ,V
b
t ,W
b
t ,Z
b
t for t = 0, . . . , T
as follows. First, put
Ybt := −Yt +Qt, X
b
t := −Xt +Qt
for all t = 0, . . . , T and
WbT := V
b
T := LT , Z
b
T := Y
b
T .
Then, for t = T − 1, . . . , 0 define by backward induction
Wbt := Z
b
t+1 ∩ Lt,
Vbt :=W
b
t +Qt,
Zbt := conv{V
b
t ∩ X
b
t ,Y
b
t }.
As compared to the seller’s Construction 4.3, apart from swapping the payoff pro-
cesses Y,X for −X,−Y , which would have been enough had there been a simple
symmetry between the buyer and seller, the operations of intersection and convex hull
are taken in the reverse order in the last line of this construction.
The proofs of the results below concerning the buyer’s case resemble those for the
seller, but certain details follow a diverse pattern to account for the differences between
the seller’s and buyer’s pricing constructions.
Just as in the seller’s case, the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 5.1
in [32] shows that the Zbt are polyhedral convex sets. Moreover, we shall see that Z
b
0
plays a similar role for the buyer as Za0 does for the seller, namely it is the set of all
initial endowments allowing the option buyer to superhedge their position. This leads
to the following result.
Theorem 5.4. The buyer’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be expressed as
pibj (Y,X) = max
{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
.
To prove this theorem we need the following family Λb(Y,X), the elements of which
can be seen as strategies superhedging the buyer’s position in a game option with
instant (rather than gradual) cancellation, gradual exercise and deferred (rather than
immediate) solvency.
Definition 5.5. We define Λb(Y,X) as the family consisting of all pairs (ψ, z), where
ψ ∈ X and z ∈ Φ, that satisfy the conditions
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
zt + ψtY + ψ
∗
t+1Xt ∈ Qt for all t = 0, . . . , T.
The next two results are similar to Propositions 4.6 and 4.7. First, Zb0 is shown to
be equal to the set of initial endowments for the strategies in Λb(Y,X).
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Proposition 5.6.
Zb0 =
{
z0 ∈ R
d | (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X)
}
.
The set of initial endowments for the strategies in Λb(Y,X) is then shown to coincide
with that for the strategies in Φb(Y,X).
Proposition 5.7.
{
z0 ∈ R
d | (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X)
}
=
{
u0 ∈ R
d | (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X)
}
.
The proofs of these two propositions are in the Appendix, Section 8. Once these
results have been established, proving that Zb0 is the set of initial endowments for the
strategies in Φb(Y,X), Theorem 5.4 follows; for details, see the proof in the Appendix,
Section 8.
5.2. Buyer’s price representation
In this section we obtain a representation of the buyer’s price of a game option with
gradual exercise, by exploiting a link with the price of an American option with gradual
exercise and payoff process −Q · ,ψ = (−Qt,ψ)
T
t=0 defined for any ψ ∈ χ, where
Qt,ψ := Qχt,ψ for t = 0, . . . , T.
Such a link is furnished by the next lemma.
Lemma 5.8. For any ψ ∈ X
{
u0 | (ψ, u) ∈ Φ
b(Y,X)
}
= {z0 | z ∈ Ψ
a(−Q · ,ψ)} ,
where −Q · ,ψ = (−Qt,ψ)
T
t=0 is the payoff process of an American option.
With the aid of this lemma, in a similar manner as in Section 4.2, we can establish
the following representation of the buyer’s price.
Theorem 5.9. The buyer’s price in currency j = 1, . . . , d of a game option (Y,X)
with gradual exercise and cancellation can be represented as
pibj (Y,X) = max
ψ∈X
min
φ∈X
min
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (φ)
EQ((Q · ,ψ · S)φ).
The proofs of Lemma 5.8 and Theorem 5.9 can be found in the Appendix, Section 8.
6. Comparison with instantaneous exercise and cancellation
We define the ask (seller’s) and bid (buyer’s) prices under instantaneous exercise and
cancellation (see Definitions 3.3 and 3.5 in [29]) within the notational conventions of
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the present paper as
pˆiaj (Y,X) := inf{x ∈ R |∃ (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ : y0 = xe
j
and (σ, y) hedges (Y,X) for the seller},
pˆibj (Y,X) := sup{−x ∈ R |∃ (σ, y) ∈ T × Φ : y0 = xe
j
and (σ, y) hedges (Y,X) for the buyer}.
Here, a pair (σ, y) is said to hedge (Y,X) for the seller under instantaneous exercise
and cancellation if y is self-financing and
yσ∧τ −Qσ,τ ∈ Kσ∧τ for all τ ∈ T . (13)
A pair (σ, y) is said to hedge (Y,X) for the buyer under instantaneous exercise and
cancellation if y is self-financing and
yτ∧σ +Qτ,σ ∈ Kτ∧σ for all τ ∈ T . (14)
The following result shows that bid-ask spreads under gradual exercise and cancel-
lation are generally tigher than under instantaneous exercise and cancellation.
Theorem 6.1.
piaj (Y,X) ≤ pˆi
a
j (Y,X), (15)
pibj (Y,X) ≥ pˆi
b
j (Y,X). (16)
The proof of Theorem 6.1 appears in the Appendix, Section 8. The example in
Section 7 shows that bid-ask spreads under gradual exercise and cancellation can
sometimes be strictly tighter than under instantaneous exercise and cancellation.
7. Example
A game option (Y,X) in a binary two-step two-currency model is presented in Fig-
ure 1. The model is recombinant; the option payoff is path-independent and has no
cancellation penalties at time 2. The model has transaction costs only at the node u
at time 1.
Constructions 3.1 and 3.4 of [29] give the bid-ask spread of the game option (Y,X)
with instant exercise and cancellation in terms of currency 2 to be [3.2, 5]. We will
show below that the bid-ask spread of (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation
is
[pib2 (Y,X), pi
a
2(Y,X)] = [
11
3 ,
14
3 ] ≈ [3.6667, 4.6667] ⊂ [3.2, 5].
(Indeed the bid and ask prices of (Y,X) can be read off the vertical axes in Figures 3
and 5 below.) Thus gradual exercise and cancellation leads to a smaller bid-ask spread
in this example.
Let us use Construction 4.3 to find the set Za0 of initial endowments that allow the
seller to superhedge (Y,X) with gradual exercise and cancellation. At time t = 2 we
15
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1
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Figure 1. Game option in binary two-step two-currency model
have
Zauu2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ 9},
Zaud2 = Z
adu
2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ 4},
Zadd2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 4x1 + x2 ≥ 0}.
Figure 2 illustrates the construction at time t = 1 at the node u, which results in
Zau1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ 6, 585 x
1 + x2 ≥ 6, 10x1 + x2 ≥ 4}.
Similar considerations at the node d give
Zad1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 6x1 + x2 ≥ 43}.
The construction at time t = 0 gives
Za0 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ 143 },
as illustrated in Figure 3.
A superhedging strategy for the seller starting from the initial endowment
(0, pia2(Y,X)) can be constructed by following similar lines as in the proof of Propo-
sition 4.6 to assemble (φ, za) ∈ Λa(Y,X), and then converting it into a superhedging
strategy (φ, ua) ∈ Φa(Y,X) using the arguments in the proof of Proposition 4.7. We il-
lustrate the first part of the process here for the scenario uu. Define first za0 :=
(
0, 143
)
; it
is clear from Figure 3 that za0 /∈ X
a
0 , leading to φ0 := 0. Choosing z
a
1 :=
(
5
6 ,−
11
3
)
∈ Wa0
then gives that
za0 − φ0X0 − z
a
1 = z
a
0 − z
a
1 ∈ Q0.
Figure 2 shows that za1 ∈ Z
a
1 ⊂ Y
a
1 . It also shows that defining φ
u
1 :=
2
3 and z
au
2 :=(
5
4 ,−
17
2
)
leads to
za1 = φ
u
1 (0, 6) + (1− φ
u
1)z
au
2 ,
16
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1
, Vau
1
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}, Zau
1
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, zau
2
with (0, 6) ∈ X au1 and z
au
2 ∈ V
au
1 = W
au
1 ⊂ Z
auu
2 = Y
auu
2 . Thus this strategy corre-
sponds to cancellation of 13 of the option at time 1 at the node u and the remaining
φuu1 :=
1
3 at time 2.
The set of superhedging strategies for the buyer of (Y,X) can be computed by
following Construction 5.3. At time t = 2,
Zbuu2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ −9},
Zbud2 = Z
bdu
2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ −4},
Zbdd2 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 4x1 + x2 ≥ 0}.
The construction at time t = 1 at the node u gives
Zbu1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 14x1 + x2 ≥ −6, 10x1 + x2 ≥ −4},
as illustrated in Figure 4. Similar considerations at the node d result in
Zbd1 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 6x1 + x2 ≥ −43}.
Figure 5 demonstrates the construction at time t = 0, which leads to
Za0 = {(x
1, x2) ∈ R2 : 10x1 + x2 ≥ −113 }.
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Similarly to the seller’s case, the construction of a superhedging strategy for the
buyer starting from the initial endowment
(
0,−pib2 (Y,X)
)
involves two steps, namely
assembling (ψ, zb) ∈ Λb(Y,X) using the construction in the proof of Proposition 5.6,
and then converting it into a superhedging strategy (ψ, ub) ∈ Φb(Y,X) following the
lines in the proof of Proposition 5.7. Let us consider again the first step for the scenario
uu. Define zb0 :=
(
0,−113
)
; then Figure 5 shows that zb0 ∈ X
b
0 but z
b
0 /∈ Y
b
0 , which leads
to ψ0 := 0. Choosing z
b
1 :=
(
− 712 ,
13
6
)
∈ Wb0 ensures that
zb0 − ψ0Y0 − z
b
1 = z
b
0 − z
b
1 ∈ Q0.
Figure 4 shows that zb1 ∈ X
bu
1 ; however z
b
1 /∈ Y
bu
1 again leads to the choice ψ
u
1 := 0.
Moreover zb1 ∈ W
bu
1 , so choosing z
bu
2 := z
b
1 gives
zb1 − ψ
u
1Y
u
1 − z
bu
2 = 0 ∈ Q
u
1 .
Note finally that zbu2 ∈ Z
buu
2 = Y
buu
2 , which leads to ψ
uu
2 := 1. Thus this strategy
corresponds to exercising the entire option at time 2 on the node uu.
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8. Appendix: proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.4: By Definition 4.2,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
Hence, according to Proposition 4.7,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Λa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
and, by Proposition 4.6,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R |xej ∈ Za0
}
.
Because Za0 is a polyhedral set, it is closed. It follows that
{
x ∈ R |xej ∈ Za0
}
is closed.
It is non-empty and bounded below because xej ∈ Za0 for any x ∈ R large enough,
and xej /∈ Za0 for any x ∈ R small enough. It follows that the infimum is in fact a
minimum. 
Proof of Proposition 4.6: Let a ∈ Za0 . We construct a mixed stopping time φ ∈ X
together with the corresponding process φ∗ and a strategy z ∈ Φ by induction. First we
put φ∗0 := 1 and z0 := a. Clearly, z0 ∈ φ
∗
0Z
a
0 . Now suppose that for some t = 0, . . . , T−1
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we have constructed zt and φ
∗
t such that zt ∈ φ
∗
tZ
a
t . It follows that zt ∈ φ
∗
tY
a
t , hence
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt.
It also follows that zt ∈ φ
∗
t conv{V
a
t ,X
a
t }, hence there exist λt ∈ [0, 1], vt ∈ V
a
t and
xt ∈ X
a
t such that zt = φ
∗
t ((1− λt)vt + λtxt). We put φt := φ
∗
tλt, and then φ
∗
t+1 :=
φ∗t − φt = φ
∗
t (1− λt), so zt = φ
∗
t+1vt + φtxt. Since xt ∈ X
a
t and vt ∈ V
a
t , it follows that
xt −Xt ∈ Qt and there is zt+1 ∈ φ
∗
t+1W
a
t such that φ
∗
t+1vt − zt+1 ∈ Qt. As a result,
zt − φtXt − zt+1 = φ
∗
t+1vt + φtxt − φtXt − zt+1
= φ∗t+1vt − zt+1 + φt (xt −Xt) ∈ Qt.
Since Wat ⊆ Z
a
t+1, it also follows that zt+1 ∈ φ
∗
t+1Z
a
t+1. Finally, given that zT ∈ φ
∗
TZ
a
T ,
we get zT ∈ φ
∗
TY
a
T , so zT−φ
∗
TYT ∈ QT , and we put φT := φ
∗
T , φ
∗
T+1 := 0 and zT+1 := 0.
We have constructed (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X) such that a = z0.
Conversely, we take any (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X), and want to show that z0 ∈ Z
a
0 . More
generally, we will show by backward induction that for each t = 0, . . . , T
zt ∈
{
φ∗tZ
a
t on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt on {φ
∗
t = 0}
. (17)
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Since zT − φ
∗
TYT = zT − φTYT ∈ QT , it follows that
zT ∈ φ
∗
TYT +QT =
{
φ∗TY
a
T on {φ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {φ
∗
T = 0}
=
{
φ∗TZ
a
T on {φ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {φ
∗
T = 0}
.
Next, suppose that (17) holds for some t = 1, . . . , T . Since z is predictable, it follows
that zt ∈ Lt−1, so
zt ∈
{
φ∗t (Z
a
t ∩ Lt−1) on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt ∩ Lt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
⊆
{
φ∗tW
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
.
Hence, using
zt−1 − φt−1Xt−1 − zt ∈ Qt−1,
we obtain
zt−1 − φt−1Xt−1 ∈ zt +Qt−1
⊆
{
φ∗tW
a
t−1 +Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 +Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
=
{
φ∗tV
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
.
It follows that
zt−1 ∈
{
φt−1Xt−1 + φ
∗
tV
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
φt−1Xt−1 +Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0}
=


φ∗tV
a
t−1 + φt−1X
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t > 0}
φt−1X
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0, φt−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t = 0, φt−1 = 0}
=
{
φ∗tV
a
t−1 + φt−1X
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
⊆
{
φ∗t conv
{
Vat−1,X
a
t−1
}
on {φ∗t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
.
Moreover, sice zt−1 − φ
∗
t−1Yt−1 ∈ Qt−1, it follows that
zt−1 ∈ φ
∗
t−1Yt−1 +Qt−1 =
{
φ∗tY
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
.
As a result,
zt−1 ∈
{
φ∗t conv
{
Vat−1,X
a
t−1
}
∩ φ∗tY
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
=
{
φ∗tZ
a
t−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {φ
∗
t−1 = 0}
,
which completes the proof. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.7: Suppose that (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X). Then, for each t =
0, . . . , T − 1
zt − φtXt − zt+1 ∈ Qt,
so there is a liquidation strategy ytt+1, . . . , y
t
T+1 starting from zt−φtYt−zt+1 at time t.
We also put yTT+1 := 0 for notational convenience. Moreover,
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt for each t = 0, . . . , T,
so there is a liquidation strategy xtt+1, . . . , x
t
T+1 starting from zt − φ
∗
tYt at time t. For
each ψ ∈ X we put
uψ0 := z0,
uψt := ψ
∗
t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
ψsx
s
t for t = 1, . . . , T + 1.
This defines u : X → Φ, which satisfies the non-anticipation condition (10). Moreover,
for each ψ ∈ X and for each t = 0, . . . , T ,
uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1
= ψ∗t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
ψsx
s
t − ψtφ
∗
tYt − ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
− ψ∗t+1zt+1 −
t∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1y
s
t+1 −
t∑
s=0
ψsx
s
t+1
= ψ∗t+1
(
zt − φtXt − zt+1 − y
t
t+1
)
+ ψt
(
zt − φ
∗
tYt − x
t
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1
(
yst − y
s
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
ψs
(
xst − x
s
t+1
)
∈ ψ∗t+1Kt + ψtKt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψ∗s+1Kt +
t−1∑
s=0
ψsKt ⊆ Kt.
This means that (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X), with z0 = u0.
Conversely, suppose that (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X). Then we put
z := uχ
T
.
It follows that for each t = 0, . . . , T − 1
zt − φtXt − zt+1 = u
χT
t +G
φ,χT
t − u
χT
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt
since
Gφ,χ
T
t = χ
T
t φ
∗
tYt + χ
T∗
t+1φtXt = φtXt.
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Next, take any t = 0, . . . , T . Then χTs = χ
t
s = 0 for each s = 0, . . . , t− 1, and because
u satisfies the non-anticipation condition (10), we have zt = u
χT
t = u
χt
t . Since χ
t
t = 1,
χt∗t+1 = 0 and
Gφ,χ
t
t = χ
t
tφ
∗
tYt + χ
t∗
t+1φtXt = φ
∗
tYt,
it means that
zt − φ
∗
tYt − u
χt
t+1 = u
χt
t +G
φ,χt
t − u
χt
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt. (18)
Moreover, for each s = t+ 1, . . . , T we have χts = χ
t∗
s+1 = 0 and
Gφ,χ
t
s = χ
t
sφ
∗
sYs + χ
t∗
s+1φtXt = 0,
hence
uχ
t
s − u
χt
s+1 = u
χt
s +G
φ,χt
s − u
χt
s+1 ∈ Ks ⊆ Qs.
We can verify by backward induction that uχ
t
s+1 ∈ Qs for each s = t, . . . , T . Clearly,
uχ
t
T+1 = 0 ∈ QT . Now suppose that u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs for some s = t + 1, . . . , T . It follows
that uχ
t
s = (u
χt
s − u
χt
s+1) + u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs +Qs = Qs. By predictability, u
χt
s ∈ Ls−1, so we
can conclude that uχ
t
s ∈ Qs ∩ Ls−1 ⊆ Qs−1, which completes the backward induction
argument. In particular, we have shown that uχ
t
t+1 ∈ Qt. Together with (18), this shows
that
zt − φ
∗
tYt ∈ Qt
for each t = 0, . . . , T . As a result, (φ, z) ∈ Λa(Y,X) with z0 = u0, which completes the
proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4.8: Take any u ∈ Φ such that (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X). Observe that
Qφ,t = Qφ,χt =
T∑
s=0
T∑
u=0
φsχ
t
uQs,u =
T∑
s=0
φs1{s≥t}Yt +
T∑
s=0
φs1{s<t}Xs
= φ∗tYt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
and define z : X → Φ such that
zψt := u
ψ
t + ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs (19)
for any ψ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then z satisfies the non-anticipation condi-
tion (5), z0 = u0, and it also satisfies the rebalancing condition (4) for an American
23
option with payoff process Qφ, · since for any ψ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T
zψt − ψtQφ,t − z
ψ
t+1
=
(
uψt + ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
− ψt
(
φ∗tYt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
−
(
uψt+1 + ψ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
φsXs
)
= uψt − ψtφ
∗
tYt − ψ
∗
t+1φtXt − u
ψ
t+1
= uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt.
Conversely, take any z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) and define u : X → Φ such that
uψt := z
ψ
t − ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
for any ψ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then u satisfies the non-anticipation condi-
tion (10), u0 = z0, and
uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1
=
(
zψt − ψ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
−
(
ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
)
−
(
zψt+1 − ψ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
φsXs
)
= zψt − ψt
(
φ∗tYt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsXs
)
− zψt+1
= zψt − ψtQφ,t − z
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt
for any ψ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T , so the rebalancing condition (9) holds. The lemma
follows because (19) defines a one-to-one map between strategies z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) and
strategies u such that (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) with u0 = z0. 
Proof of Theorem 4.9: According to Definition 4.2,
piaj (Y,X) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
. (20)
By Theorem 4.4, piaj (Y,X)e
j ∈ Za0 . Hence, by Proposition 4.6, there is a (φ, z) ∈
Λa(Y,X) such that piaj (Y,X)e
j = z0. It follows by Proposition 4.7 that there is a
(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) such that piaj (Y,X)e
j = u0, so the infimum in (20) is in fact a
minimum,
piaj (Y,X) = min
{
x ∈ R | ∃(φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
As a result, according to Lemma 4.8 and Definition 2.3,
piaj (Y,X) = min
{
x ∈ R | ∃φ ∈ χ∃z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) : xe
j = z0
}
= min
φ∈χ
inf
{
x ∈ R |∃z ∈ Ψa(Qφ, · ) : xe
j = z0
}
= min
φ∈χ
paj (Qφ, · ),
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where paj (Qφ, · ) is the seller’s price of an American option with gradual exercise and
payoff process Qφ, · , which can be expressed as
paj (Qφ, · ) = max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (ψ)
EQ((Qφ, · · S)ψ)
by Theorem 2.4. It follows that
piaj (Y,X) = min
φ∈X
max
ψ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (ψ)
EQ((Qφ, · · S)ψ),
completing the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.4: Using Definition 5.2 and Propositions 5.6 and 5.7, we obtain
pibj (Y,X) = sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Λb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= sup
{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
.
Being a polyhedral set, Zb0 is closed, hence
{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
is closed. Moreover,{
−x ∈ R |xej ∈ Zb0
}
is non-empty and bounded above because xej ∈ Zb0 for any x ∈ R
large enough and xej /∈ Zb0 for any x ∈ R small enough, so the supremum is in fact a
maximum. 
Proof of Proposition 5.6: Let a ∈ Zb0 . We construct a mixed stopping time ψ ∈ X
and a strategy z ∈ Φ by induction. First we put ψ∗0 := 1 and z0 := a. Clearly,
z0 ∈ ψ
∗
0Z
b
0 . Next, suppose that zt ∈ ψ
∗
tZ
b
t for some t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Then zt ∈
ψ∗t conv{V
b
t ∩ X
b
t ,Y
b
t }, so there exist λt ∈ [0, 1], vt ∈ V
b
t ∩ X
b
t and yt ∈ Y
b
t such that
zt = ψ
∗
t ((1− λt)vt + λtyt). We put ψt := ψ
∗
t λt, and then ψ
∗
t+1 := ψ
∗
t −ψt = ψ
∗
t (1−λt),
so zt = ψ
∗
t+1vt + ψtyt. Because vt ∈ X
b
t and yt ∈ Y
b
t , we have vt + Xt ∈ Qt and
yt + Yt ∈ Qt. It follows that
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt = ψ
∗
t+1vt + ψtyt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt
= ψ∗t+1(vt +Xt) + ψt(yt + Yt)
∈ ψ∗t+1Qt + ψtQt ⊆ Qt.
Since vt ∈ V
b
t , there is a zt+1 ∈ ψ
∗
t+1W
b
t such that ψ
∗
t+1vt − zt+1 ∈ Qt. It follows that
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 = ψ
∗
t+1vt + ψtyt + ψtYt − zt+1
= (ψ∗t+1vt − zt+1) + ψt(yt + Yt) ∈ Qt.
Since Wbt ⊆ Z
b
t+1, it also follows that zt+1 ∈ ψ
∗
t+1Z
b
t+1. Finally, given that zT ∈
ψ∗TZ
b
T = ψ
∗
TY
b
T , we get zT + ψTYT = zT + ψ
∗
TYT ∈ QT . Putting and ψT := ψ
∗
T ,
ψ∗T+1 := 0 and zT+1 := 0, we obtain
zT + ψTYT + ψ
∗
T+1XT ∈ QT .
We have constructed (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X) such that a = z0.
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Conversely, we take any (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X), and want to show that z0 ∈ Z
b
0 . This
a consequence of the following fact, which will be proved by backward induction: for
each t = 0, . . . , T
zt ∈
{
ψ∗tZ
b
t on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
. (21)
We start the proof with t = T . Since zT + ψ
∗
TYT = zT + ψTYT + ψ
∗
T+1XT ∈ QT , it
follows that indeed
zT ∈ −ψ
∗
TYT +QT =
{
ψ∗TY
b
T on {ψ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {ψ
∗
T = 0}
=
{
ψ∗TZ
b
T on {ψ
∗
T > 0}
QT on {ψ
∗
T = 0}
.
Next, suppose that (21) holds for some t = 1, . . . , T . Since z is predictable, it follows
that zt ∈ Lt−1, so
zt ∈
{
ψ∗t (Z
b
t ∩ Lt−1) on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt ∩ Lt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
⊆
{
ψ∗tW
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
.
Hence, using
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 − zt ∈ Qt−1,
we obtain
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 ∈ zt +Qt−1
⊆
{
ψ∗tW
b
t−1 +Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 +Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
=
{
ψ∗t V
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
.
Moreover, since
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 + ψ
∗
tXt−1 ∈ Qt−1,
we obtain
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 ∈ Qt−1 − ψ
∗
tXt−1 =
{
ψ∗tX
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
.
It follows that
zt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 ∈
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
,
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and so
zt−1 ∈
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Yt−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 + ψt−1Yt−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
⊆
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
Qt−1 + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0}
=


ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t > 0}
ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t = 0, ψ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
=
{
ψ∗t (V
b
t−1 ∩ X
b
t−1) + ψt−1Y
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
⊆
{
ψ∗t−1 conv
{
Vbt−1 ∩ X
b
t−1,Y
b
t−1
}
on {ψ∗t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
=
{
ψ∗t−1Z
b
t−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 > 0}
Qt−1 on {ψ
∗
t−1 = 0}
,
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5.7: Suppose that (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X). Then, for each t =
0, . . . , T − 1,
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 ∈ Qt,
so there is a liquidation strategy ytt+1, . . . , y
t
T+1 starting from zt+ψtYt−zt+1 at time t.
We also put yTT+1 := 0 for notational convenience. Moreover,
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt ∈ Qt for each t = 0, . . . , T,
so there is a liquidation strategy xtt+1, . . . , x
t
T+1 starting from zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt at
time t. For each φ ∈ X we put
uφ0 := z0,
uφt := φ
∗
t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
φsx
s
t for t = 1, . . . , T + 1.
This defines u : X → Φ, which satisfies the non-anticipation condition (12). Moreover,
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for each ψ ∈ X and for each t = 0, . . . , T
uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1
= φ∗t zt +
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1y
s
t +
t−1∑
s=0
φsx
s
t + ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
− φ∗t+1zt+1 −
t∑
s=0
φ∗s+1y
s
t+1 −
t∑
s=0
φsx
s
t+1
= φ∗t+1
(
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 − y
t
t+1
)
+ φt
(
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt − x
t
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1
(
yst − y
s
t+1
)
+
t−1∑
s=0
φs
(
xst − x
s
t+1
)
∈ φ∗t+1Kt + φtKt +
t−1∑
s=0
φ∗s+1Kt +
t−1∑
s=0
φsKt ⊆ Kt.
This means that (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X), with z0 = u0.
Conversely, suppose that (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X). Then we put
z := uχ
T
.
It follows that for each t = 0, . . . , T − 1
zt + ψtYt − zt+1 = u
χT
t −G
χT ,ψ
t − u
χT
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt
since
Gχ
T ,ψ
t = ψtχ
T∗
t Yt + ψ
∗
t+1χ
T
t Xt = ψtYt.
Next, take any t = 0, . . . , T . Then χTs = χ
t
s = 0 for each s = 0, . . . , t − 1, and
because u satisfies the non-anticipation condition (12), we have zt = u
χT
t = u
χt
t . Since
χtt = χ
t∗
t = 1 and
Gχ
t,ψ
t = ψtχ
t∗
t Yt + ψ
∗
t+1χ
t
tXt = ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt,
it means that
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt − u
χt
t+1 = u
χt
t +G
χt,ψ
t − u
χt
t+1 ∈ Kt ⊆ Qt. (22)
Moreover, for each s = t+ 1, . . . , T we have χts = χ
t∗
s = 0 and
Gχ
t,s
s = ψsχ
t∗
s Ys + ψ
∗
s+1χ
t
sXs = 0,
hence
uχ
t
s − u
χt
s+1 = u
χt
s +G
χt,ψ
s − u
χt
s+1 ∈ Ks ⊆ Qs.
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We can verify by backward induction that uχ
t
s+1 ∈ Qs for each s = t, . . . , T . Clearly,
uχ
t
T+1 = 0 ∈ QT . Now suppose that u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs for some s = t + 1, . . . , T . It follows
that uχ
t
s = (u
χt
s − u
χt
s+1) + u
χt
s+1 ∈ Qs +Qs = Qs. By predictability, u
χt
s ∈ Ls−1, so we
can conclude that uχ
t
s ∈ Qs ∩ Ls−1 ⊆ Qs−1, which completes the backward induction
argument. In particular, we have shown that uχ
t
t+1 ∈ Qt. Together with (22), this shows
that
zt + ψtYt + ψ
∗
t+1Xt ∈ Qt
for each t = 0, . . . , T . As a result, (ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X) with z0 = u0, which completes
the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 5.8: Observe that for any ψ ∈ X
Qt,ψ = Qχt,ψ =
T∑
u=0
T∑
s=0
χtuψsQu,s =
T∑
s=0
ψs
(
1{t≥s}Ys + 1{t<s}Xt
)
=
t∑
s=0
ψsYs + ψ
∗
t+1Xt.
Now take any u ∈ Φ such that (ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) and define z : X → Φ such that
zφt := u
φ
t − φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs (23)
for any φ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then z satisfies the non-anticipation condi-
tion (5), z0 = u0, and it also satisfies the rebalancing condition (4) for an American
option with payoff process Z = Q · ,ψ since for any t = 0, . . . , T
zφt + φtQt,ψ − z
φ
t+1
=
(
uφt − φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
+ φt
(
t∑
s=0
ψsYs + ψ
∗
t+1Xt
)
−
(
uφt+1 − φ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
= uφt + ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt − u
φ
t+1
= uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1 ∈ Kt.
Conversely, take any z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) and define u : X → Φ such that
uφt := z
φ
t + φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs
for any φ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T + 1. Then u satisfies the non-anticipation condi-
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tion (12), u0 = z0, and
uφt +G
φ,ψ
t − u
φ
t+1
=
(
zφt + φ
∗
t
t−1∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
+
(
ψtφ
∗
tYt + ψ
∗
t+1φtXt
)
−
(
zφt+1 + φ
∗
t+1
t∑
s=0
ψsYs
)
= zφt + φt
(
t∑
s=0
ψsYs + ψ
∗
t+1Xt
)
− zφt+1
= zφt + φtQt,ψ − z
φ
t+1 ∈ Kt
for any φ ∈ X and any t = 0, . . . , T , that is, the rebalancing condition (11) holds.
The lemma follows because (23) defines a one-to-one map between strategies z ∈
Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) and strategies u such that (ψ, u) ∈ Φ
b(Y,X) with u0 = z0. 
Proof of Theorem 5.9: By Definition 5.2,
pibj (Y,X) = sup
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
. (24)
According to Theorem 5.4, −pibj (Y,X)e
j ∈ Zb0 . Hence, by Proposition 5.6, there is a
(ψ, z) ∈ Λb(Y,X) such that −pibj (Y,X)e
j = z0, and so, by Proposition 5.7, there is a
(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) such that −pibj (Y,X)e
j = u0. It follows that the supremum in (24)
is attained,
pibj (Y,X) = max
{
−x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
= −min
{
x ∈ R | ∃(ψ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) : xej = u0
}
.
Hence, according to Lemma 5.8 and Definition 2.3,
pibj (Y,X) = −min
{
x ∈ R | ∃ψ ∈ X∃z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) : xe
j = z0
}
= −min
ψ∈X
inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) : xe
j = z0
}
= −min
ψ∈X
paj (−Q · ,ψ),
where
paj (−Q · ,ψ) = inf
{
x ∈ R | ∃z ∈ Ψa(−Q · ,ψ) : xe
j = z0
}
is the seller’s price of an American option under gradual exercise with payoff pro-
cess −Q · ,ψ. By Theorem 2.4,
paj (−Q · ,ψ) = max
φ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (φ)
EQ((−Q · ,ψ · S)φ),
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so
pibj (Y,X) = −min
ψ∈X
paj (−Q · ,ψ)
= −min
ψ∈X
max
φ∈X
max
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (φ)
EQ((−Q · ,ψ · S)φ)
= max
ψ∈X
min
φ∈X
min
(Q,S)∈P¯dj (φ)
EQ((Q · ,ψ · S)φ).
Theorem 5.9 has been proved. 
Proof of Theorem 6.1: Comparing the definitions of piaj (Y,X) and pˆi
a
j (Y,X), as well
as those of pibj (Y,X) and pˆi
b
j (Y,X), we can see that to prove (15) and (16) it suffices
to show that for every pair (σ, y) ∈ T ×Φ which hedges (Y,X) for the seller there is a
pair (φ, u) ∈ Φa(Y,X) such that y0 = u0, and that for every pair (σ, y) ∈ T ×Φ which
hedges (Y,X) for the buyer there is a pair (φ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) such that y0 = u0. To
this end, in either case we put
φ := χσ,
uψt := ψ
∗
t yt1{σ≥t} for each ψ ∈ X and each t = 0, . . . , T + 1.
Then, clearly, y0 = u0. It remains to show that (φ, u) ∈ Φ
a(Y,X) if (σ, y) hedges for
the seller, and (φ, u) ∈ Φb(Y,X) if (σ, y) hedges for the buyer. Since ψ∗t = 1−
∑t−1
s=0 ψs,
we can see that uψt depends on ψ via ψ0, . . . , ψt−1, so it satisfies the non-anticipation
condition (10) in Definition 4.1 or (12) in Definition 5.1. Finally, we need to verify the
rebalancing condition (9) in the seller’s case and (11) in the buyer’s case. From (8),
we obtain
uψt −G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1 =


ψt (yt − Yt) + ψ
∗
t+1 (yt − yt+1) on {t < σ} ,
ψt (yt − Yt) + ψ
∗
t+1 (yt −Xt) on {t = σ} ,
0 on {t > σ}
in the seller’s case, and in the buyer’s case
uψt +G
ψ,φ
t − u
ψ
t+1 =


ψt (yt +Xt) + ψ
∗
t+1 (yt − yt+1) on {t < σ} ,
ψ∗t (yt + Yt) on {t = σ} ,
0 on {t > σ} .
In both cases, the self-financing condition (1) gives that yt − yt+1 ∈ Kt for each
t = 0, . . . , T−1. Condition (13) for the seller together with (6) implies that yt−Yt ∈ Kt
on {t ≤ σ}, and also for t < T that yt −Xt ∈ Kt on {t = σ}. Because Kt is a convex
cone and ψ∗T+1 = 0, it follows that u
ψ
t − G
φ,ψ
t − u
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt, completing the proof
of (9). Moreover, condition (14) for the buyer implies that yt + Xt ∈ Kt on {t < σ}
and yt + Yt ∈ Kt on {t = σ}, hence it follows that u
ψ
t +G
ψ,φ
t − u
ψ
t+1 ∈ Kt, completing
the proof of (11). 
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